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Abstract. Federated cloud systems increase the reliability and reduce
the cost of computational support to an organization. The resulting com-
bination of secure private clouds and less secure public clouds impacts on
the security requirements of the system. To meet these security require-
ments, applications need to be located within different clouds, which
strongly affects the information flow security of the entire system. In
this paper, a flow sensitive security model for a federated cloud system
is proposed, secure information flow in such a system is analyzed using
coloured Petri nets, and opacity of cloud computing systems is intro-
duced.
In this study, the entities of a federated cloud system are assigned secu-
rity levels of a given flow lattice. A transition system is used to describe
the behavior of the system, and coloured Petri nets are used to analyze
the correctness of the entire system. As a result, one can track the infor-
mation flow. Moreover, one can analyze the impact of different resource
allocation strategies, and the opacity of the system.
Keywords: opacity, coloured Petri nets, information flow security, fed-
erated cloud system, information lattice
1 Introduction
The extent and importance of cloud computing is rapidly increasing due to the
ever increasing demand for internet services and communications. Instead of
building individual information technology infrastructure to host databases or
software, a third party can host them in its large server clouds. However, large
organizations may wish to keep sensitive information on their more restricted
servers rather than in the public cloud. This has led to the introduction of feder-
ated cloud computing (FCC) in which both public and private cloud computing
resources are used [17, 18].
A federated cloud is the deployment and management of multiple could com-
puting services with the aim of matching business needs. Data, services, and
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software are required to be allocated in different clouds for both security and
business concerns. Although federated cloud systems (FCSs) can increase the
reliability and reduce the cost of computational support to an organization, the
large number of services and data on a cloud system creates security risks. As a
result, it is very hard for an organization to track and control the information
flow in the system. It is therefore necessary to develop a formal model describing
the information flow security within an FCS, making the information and data
traceable.
There exist different methods for addressing workflow security; for example,
the flow-sensitive analysis of programs [16, 10, 15]. Using Petri nets to model the
workflow, [12] applied Bell-LaPadula model to workflow security. However, the
deployment of blocks within a workflow across a set of computational resources
was not considered. The paper [18] proposed to partition workflows over a set
of available clouds in such a way that security requirements are met. Such an
approach is based on a multi-level security model that extends Bell-LaPadula to
encompass cloud computing. [18] also indicated that workflow transformations
are needed with data being communicated between clouds. However, the concur-
rency of the events or the execution of tasks in the system was not considered.
In this paper, we introduce a transition system representation to capture
the information flow in a federated cloud system, and to use Coloured Petri
Nets (CPNs) to analyze the security of information flow. Moreover, the opacity
of cloud computing systems is discussed in order to help organizations in the
analysis of the impact of different resource allocation strategies.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, information lattices for secure
information flow are introduced. In Section 3, a model for secure information
flow analysis in FCSs is presented. A CPN model for the analysis of secure
information flow is outlined in Section 4 using a case study. Finally, the opacity
of cloud computing system is discussed in Section 5.
2 Information Lattices
In this section, we introduce security lattices for the components of a cloud
system as well as for sets of individual clouds.
A lattice for security concerns [7, 8, 13] L = (L,≤) consists of a set L and
a partial order relation ≤ such that, for all l, l′ ∈ L, there exists a least upper
bound l unionsq l′ ∈ L, and a greatest lower bound l u l′ ∈ L. The lattice is complete
if each subset L′ of L has both a least upper bound
∐
L′ and a greatest lower
bound
∏
L′.
Throughout the paper, we will assume that the origin of a federated cloud
is a set C of single deployment clouds. Moreover, S will denote subjects (e.g.
services, programs and processes), and O will denote objects (e.g. resources and
messages). Subjects and objects will jointly be referred to as entities, and their
set will be denoted by E .
Following [13], at the centre of our approach is a complete security lattice
Lsec = (Lsec ,≤sec) with the ordering ≤sec on security levels in Lsec .
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We will assign a security (or confidentiality) level l(e) ∈ Lsec to any entity
e ∈ E which will in practice be related to the degree of security of the contents
of e. Moreover, each cloud c ∈ C will also be assigned a security level l(c) ∈ Lsec .
Intuitively, l(c) specifies the highest allowed security level of the entities located
in c.
3 System Model
Information flow security is concerned with the way in which secure information
is allowed to flow through a computing system. Intuitively, the flow is consid-
ered secure if it adheres to a specified security policy. In this section, a formal
model is introduced for capturing the information flow in federated cloud com-
puting systems. The state transitions of the model can then be analyzed to verify
that they satisfy conditions of a given security policy such as non-interference
properties [9], Bell-Lapadula rules [3] for confidentiality considerations, Biba
policies [4], and user-specified policies.
We now introduce a framework for security models of federated cloud comput-
ing systems based on guarded actions, each guard capturing security constraints
introduced in order to ensure the security properties of interest.
Throughout this section, we assume that C and E are finite non-empty sets of
respectively clouds and entities (or entity names), and Lsec is a security lattice
as defined above. We also assume that there is a mapping l : C ∪ E → Lsec
assigning security levels to individual clouds and entities.
In what follows, an entity can have different copies, and each of these copies
can have a different security level and may reside in a different cloud. We further
allow multiple copies of a single entity to be present in a single deployment cloud.
As a result, in what follows, we will mean by a state any finite multiset s over
the set E × C × Lsec . Thus, for example, if s(a, c, 2) = 4 then we know that in
the current state there are 4 copies of entity a with security level 2 residing in
cloud c. The elements of E × C × Lsec will be referred to as actual entities. We
will say that an actual entity (e, c, l) is present in state s if s(e, c, l) > 0.
Definition 1 (fssm). A flow-sensitive security model is a pair
FSSM = (A, sinit) , (1)
where A is a finite set of actions and sinit is an initial state. It is assumed that
each action is a triple
φ = (in, out,Σ) (2)
such that the first two components
in = (e1@c1, . . . , ek@ck) and out = (ek+1@ck+1, . . . , ek+m@ck+m)
are finite tuples of entity-cloud pairs and Σ ⊆ Lk+msec is a (security) guard.
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Note that security guards can be provided in the form of a suitable predicate
over k + m variables and suitable constants (such as security levels of given
clouds).3
Definition 2 (single action execution). An action φ as in (2) is σ-enabled
at state s if σ = (l1, . . . , lk+m) ∈ Σ is a tuple of security levels such that4
φinσ = {(e1, c1, l1), . . . , (ek, ck, lk)} ≤ s .
Such an action can then be σ-executed leading to a new state5
s′ = s− φinσ + φoutσ ,
where φoutσ = {(ek+1, ck+1, lk+1), . . . , (ek+m, ck+m, lk+m)}. We denote this by
s
φ:σ−→ s′.
The last definition captures the enabling and execution of a single action.
The next definition lifts this to any group of actions executed simultaneously.
Definition 3 (multiset action execution). Let Φ = {φ1 : σ1, . . . , φn : σn} be
a multiset such that each φi is an action σi-enabled at state s and, moreover,
Φin = (φ1)
in
σ1 + . . .+ (φn)
in
σn ≤ s .
Then Φ can then be executed leading to a new state
s′ = s− Φin + Φout ,
where Φout = (φ1)
out
σ1 + . . .+ (φn)
out
σn . We denote this by s
Φ−→ s′.
Definition 4 (reachable states). The set of reachable states of the flow-
sensitive security model as in (1) is the minimal set of states RS containing
sinit and such that if s ∈ RS and s Φ−→ s′, for some Φ, then s′ ∈ RS.
We have defined general notions related to the syntax and operational se-
mantics of a flow-sensitive security model. It is then straightforward to capture
the basic notion of security across the federated cloud.
Definition 5. A state s is secure if, for every actual entity (e, c, l) present in s,
l ≤sec l(c). A flow-sensitive security model as in (1) is secure if all its reachable
states are secure.
Intuitively, a state is secure if all copies of entities present in the state reside
in clouds without causing security violation. One can formulate a general security
policy guaranteeing the security of a flow-sensitive security model. Such a policy
is formulated by placing a suitable condition on the security guards present in
the model.
3 One may extend the class of allowed action types to include, for example, checking
of absence of certain entities.
4 Note that ≤ denotes multiset inclusion.
5 Note that ‘−’ and ‘+’ denote multiset subtraction and addition, respectively.
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Theorem 1. Let FSSM be a flow-sensitive security model as in (1) such that,
for every action φ as in (2), {ck+1, . . . , ck+m} ⊆ {c1, . . . , ck} and if (l1, . . . , lk+m) ∈
Σ then, for every i = k + 1, . . . , k +m:∐
{p>k|cp=ci}
lp ≤sec
∏
{r≤k|cr=ci}
lr .
Then FSSM is secure provided that its initial state is secure.
The above result can only be applied in specific cases; in general, we need
to verify that a given system specification yields a secure system. In the next
section, we will outline how coloured Petri nets can be used to provide a suitable
analytical tool.
4 Coloured Petri Net Model
Coloured Petri Nets (CPNs) can be used to model concurrent systems, includ-
ing information flow in FCSs. In particular, Petri net theory provides powerful
analysis techniques which can be used to verify the correctness of workflow proce-
dures [1, 2]. Transitions in Petri nets can be interpreted as occurrences of events
or executions of tasks in a system. In our representation of FCSs in CPNs, the
relations between events are explicit, and the representation of the system can
alleviate the state explosion problem [6].
CPNs allow one to model multi-type cases in a process specification [11],
which can model different entities of an FCS. Each token can carry complex
information and/or data. Arc expressions and multiple exits can be used to
model the various workflow logics. Moreover, guard functions associated with
transitions can be used to specify security-related conditions.
Fig. 1. The medical research application example from [18].
4.1 Case study
As a case study adapted to our purposes, we will use a simplified version of the
federated cloud system of [18]. It is a medical research application in which data
from a set of patients’ heart rate monitors is analyzed, as illustrated in Figure 1.
Informally, the process can be described as follows:
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Fig. 2. A workflow of the case study in [18].
– The input data (d0) is a file with a header identifying the patient (name and
patient number), followed by a set of heart rate data recoded over a period
of time;
– A service (s1) strips off the header, leaving only the heart rate data (d2);
– A second service (s3) analyzes the heart rate data, and produces results (d4).
Analyzing the heart rate data (s3) is costly and would benefit from a cheap,
scalable resources that are available on public clouds. However, considering that
storing medical records on a public cloud can breach confidentiality, some orga-
nizations prefer to deploy the whole workflow on a secure private cloud. Such
a policy may overstretch the limited resources available on the private cloud,
resulting in degraded performance and negative impact on other applications.
To address this problem, the partitioning of the application between a private
cloud and a public cloud could provide a better solution.
In our case study, we use two clouds, one one public cloud c0 and one private
cloud c1. The proposed workflow operates on sensitive medical data processed
on the private cloud, and anonymised data that can be deployed on the public
cloud.
Figure 2 is a workflow which is derived from Figure 1, with the security
settings shown in Table 1, where {c0, c1} are the clouds in the system, {s1, s3}
are the services, and {d0, d2, d4} are the data.
Table 1. Security level of clouds, services and data in the FCS of [18].
Clouds Security level Services Security level Data Security level
c0 0 s1 1 d0 1
c1 1 s3 0 d2 0
d4 0
After determining valid mappings of services and data to clouds based on
the Bell-Lapadula rules, the workflow in Figure 2 leads to six valid partitionings.
Fig. 3. A valid workflow partitioning for the FCS of [18].
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The partitioning chosen for this case study is shown in Figure 3: {s1, d0, d2} are
services and data deployed on cloud c1 whose security level is 1, while {s3, d2, d4}
are deployed on cloud c0 whose security level is 0.
4.2 CPN model
Based on the FCS model outlined above, we built a CPN model capturing the
information flow of the FCS in the case study, shown in Figure 4.
serv(sn, sc, ls)
serv(sn, sc, ls)
if #1 (dn, dc, ld) = d(0)
then 1`data(d(2), dc, ld2)
else empty
serv(sn, sc ,ls)
data(dn, dc, ld)
if #1 (dn, dc, ld) = d(2)
then 1`data(d(4), sc, ld4)
else empty
data(dn, dc, ld)
serv(sn, sc, ls)
t2
[#1(dn, dc, ld) = d(2)
andalso #1 (sn, sc, ls) = s(3)
andalso #3 (dn, dc, ld) <= #3 (sn, sc, ls)
andalso #3 (dn, dc, ld) <= #2 (sn, sc, ls)]
t1
[#1(dn, dc, ld) = d(0)
andalso #1(sn, sc, ls) = s(1)
andalso #3 (dn, dc, ld) <= #3 (sn, sc, ls)
andalso #3 (dn, dc, ld) <= #2(sn, sc, ls)]
cloud0
1`serv((s(3), c0, ls3))
entity
cloud1
1`data((d(0), c1, ld0))++
1`serv((s(1), c1, ls1))
entity
· val ls1 = 1; · closet lsec = int with 0..1;
· val ls3 = 0; · closet dName = index d with 0..4;
· val ld0 = 1; · closet dataInfor = product dName * lsec * lsec ;
· val ld2 = 0; · colset sName = index s with 1..3 ;
· val ld4 = 0; · colset servInfor = product sName * lsec * lsec ;
· val c1 = 1; · colset entity = union data: dataInfor + serv: servInfor;
· val c0 = 0; · var sn: sName;
· var dn: dName; · var ld, ls, dc, sc: lsec;
Fig. 4. CPN model (including the colour sets) for a federated cloud system.
The model provides an abstract view of CPN model of the chosen work-
flow partitioning of the FCS. It has two places cloud1 and cloud0, which repre-
sent the two clouds, and two transitions, t1 and t2. Places store the entities of
the system, which have the type entity as the colour set (describing the data
are needed to be processed in the system). The declarations of the colour sets
in Figure 4 tell us that that entity is a union type, which corresponds to a
datatype in Standard ML, with the values being are either data (data) or ser-
vices (serv). data and serv have an associated product colour sets which allows
one to distinguish each individual entity. Thus, the type entity contains the
values {data((d(0), 1, 1), serv(s(1), 1, 1), . . .}. Each token has a colour which has
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three fields. The first field is an element of dName or sName, and thus it is
d0 or d1 or d2 or d3 or d4 or s1 or s2 or s3, which specifies the name of the
data/services in the system. The second element is an integer which specifies
the security level of the cloud where the service/data is located. The third ele-
ment is also an integer, specifying the security level of the service/data. Each of
the two transitions, t1 and t2, represents a move from one state to the next.
5 Opacity in Cloud Computing Systems
Observing behaviour patterns of users can lead to leakages of secure information.
Information sharing means that the behaviour of one cloud user may appear vis-
ible to other cloud users or adversaries, and observations of such behaviours can
potentially help adversaries to build covert channels. Opacity is a uniform ap-
proach for describing security properties expressed as predicates [5]. A predicate
is opaque if an observer of the system is unable to determine the truth of the
predicate in a given run of the system. In this section, we will discuss one of
the versions of opacity in the context of workflows executed on federated cloud
computing systems.
Let FSSM = (A, sinit) be a flow-sensitive security model as in (1). A run of
FSSM is a finite sequence
ξ = Φ1 . . . Φn (n ≥ 0) (3)
such that there are states sinit = s1, . . . , sn+1 satiafying si
Φi−→ si+1, for i =
1, . . . , n. The set of all runs of FSSM will be denoted by RUN (FSSM ).
To model the different capabilities for observing the system modelled by
FSSM one can use observation functions:
obs : RUN (FSSM )→ Obs∗
where Obs be a set of observables. In what follows, we consider a state observation
function obs for which there is a map obs′ associating obs′(Φ) ∈ Obs ∪ {} with
every Φ as in Definition 3, in such a way that
obs(ξ) = obs′(Φ1) . . . obs′(Φn)
for every run ξ = Φ1 . . . Φn in RUN (FSSM ).
Given the observation function obs, we are now interested in whether an
observer can establish a property γ (a predicate over system runs) for a run
of FSSM having only access to the result of the observation function. As one
can identify γ with its characteristic set, i.e. the set of all those runs for which
it holds, we would want to find out whether the fact that the underlying run
belongs to γ ⊆ RUN (FSSM ) can be deduced by the observer on the basis of an
observed execution of the system. Moreover, we are interested in the final opacity
predicate γZ , defined as the set of all the runs ξ as in (3) satisfying sn ∈ Z, for
some set of states Z [5]. Intuitively, this means that we are interested in finding
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out whether an observed run of the system represented by FSSM ended in one
of secret (or sensitive) states belonging to Z. Note that we are not interested
in establishing whether the underlying run does not belong to γ; to do this, we
would consider the property γ¯ = RUN (FSSM ) \ γ.
We then say that γ is opaque w.r.t. obs if, for every run ξ ∈ γ, there is another
run ξ ∈ γ¯ such that obs(ξ) = obs(ξ′). In other words, if all runs in γ are covered
by runs in γ¯:
obs(γ) ⊆ obs(γ¯) .
5.1 Case study
The scenario of this case study involves three clouds (W , X, and Y ) and a
number of processes, which all together form an e:shop application. Cloud X
hosts a web portal e:win; Cloud W hosts two providers, e:prov1 and e:prov2 ;
and cloud Y hosts a payment handling site, e:pay , and an internet bank, e:bank .
The functionality of the e:shop is built around the transmission of information
between the various predefined process participants, such as the providers and
bank.
Fig. 5. Information flow in a cloud based e:shop.
Figure 5 shows the basic structure of the execution scenario for the e:shop.
The role of each of the processes is as follows:
– client tries to buy a product online, accessing to cloud based retail applica-
tions through a web browser.
– e:win is a web portal which provides a platform for trading.
– e:prov1 and e:prov2 supply products traded by e:shop.
– e:pay is an agent through which client can make online payment and transfer
money between bank accounts.
– e:bank can handle payments and deposits through the e:pay agent.
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The generic behaviour of e:shop is shown in Table 2. It starts with a pur-
chase request sent from client to e:win. The request is forwarded to the product
providers, e:prov1 and e:prov2 , who reply with the relevant product informa-
tion. e:win forwards the received information to client , who selects one of the
two products and sends the decision back to e:win. Then e:win forwards the de-
cision to e:pay which contacts client asking for payment details. After receiving
the payment information, e:pay contacts e:bank to carry out the payment. Then
e:pay sends an invoice to client and informs e:win. Finally, e:win contacts the
selected provider to trigger the shipment of the product to client . Moreover, the
selected provider is not allowed to reveal their identity to an observer.
Table 2. The sequence of interactions between the components of the e:shop system.
Entities (subject) Actions Sender Receiver (object)
1 client’s request Φ1 client e:win
2 forward client’s request Φi2 e:win e:provi (i=1,2)
3 product’s information Φi3 e:provi (i=1,2) e:win
4 forward product’s information Φ4 e:win client
5 choose products Φ5 client e:win
6 forward the client to the payment Φ6 e:win e:pay
7 client’s information request Φ7 e:pay client
8 make payment Φ8 client e:pay
9 contact bank Φ9 e:pay e:bank
10 make payment Φ10 e:bank e:pay
11 send invoices Φ11 e:pay client
12 inform of the payment Φ12 e:pay e:win
13 inform of the payment Φi13 e:win e:provi (i=1,2)
14 ship product Φi14 e:provi (i=1,2) client
We also assume that no provider is discriminated against. Moreover, messages
communicated between the clouds X, W and Y are invisible, and other messages
are visible. However, the observer has no means of detecting their content (but
can observe the specific cloud from which a message originated or was sent to).
This can be captured by the following (static) observation function:
obs′(Φ1) = a obs′(Φ12) =  obs
′(Φ22) = 
obs′(Φ13) =  obs
′(Φ23) =  obs
′(Φ4) = b
obs′(Φ5) = a obs′(Φ6) =  obs′(Φ7) = c
obs′(Φ8) = d obs′(Φ9) =  obs′(Φ10) = 
obs′(Φ11) = c obs′(Φ12) =  obs′(Φ113) = 
obs′(Φ213) =  obs
′(Φ114) = e obs
′(Φ214) = e
Using opacity, we may show that visible interaction do not reveal the iden-
tity of the provider supplying the goods. To see this, we consider a property γ
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consisting of all execution scenarios where the first provider supplied the goods,
i.e., executions of the following form:
ξ1 = Φ1Φ
1
2Φ
2
2Φ
1
3Φ
2
3Φ4Φ5Φ6Φ7Φ8Φ9Φ10Φ11Φ12Φ
1
13Φ
1
14
ξ2 = Φ1Φ
2
2Φ
1
2Φ
1
3Φ
2
3Φ4Φ5Φ6Φ7Φ8Φ9Φ10Φ11Φ12Φ
1
13Φ
1
14
ξ3 = Φ1Φ
1
2Φ
2
2Φ
2
3Φ
1
3Φ4Φ5Φ6Φ7Φ8Φ9Φ10Φ11Φ12Φ
1
13Φ
1
14
ξ4 = Φ1Φ
2
2Φ
1
2Φ
2
3Φ
1
3Φ4Φ5Φ6Φ7Φ8Φ9Φ10Φ11Φ12Φ
1
13Φ
1
14
The set of observations they generate is given by obs(γ) = {abacdce}. We then
note that γ¯ comprises, among others, executions of the following kind:
ξ1 = Φ1Φ
1
2Φ
2
2Φ
1
3Φ
2
3Φ4Φ5Φ6Φ7Φ8Φ9Φ10Φ11Φ12Φ
2
13Φ
2
14
ξ2 = Φ1Φ
2
2Φ
1
2Φ
1
3Φ
2
3Φ4Φ5Φ6Φ7Φ8Φ9Φ10Φ11Φ12Φ
2
13Φ
2
14
ξ3 = Φ1Φ
1
2Φ
2
2Φ
2
3Φ
1
3Φ4Φ5Φ6Φ7Φ8Φ9Φ10Φ11Φ12Φ
2
13Φ
2
14
ξ4 = Φ1Φ
2
2Φ
1
2Φ
2
3Φ
1
3Φ4Φ5Φ6Φ7Φ8Φ9Φ10Φ11Φ12Φ
2
13Φ
2
14
Hence obs(γ) ⊆ obs(γ¯), and so γ is an opaque property. As a result, it is never
possible to say for sure that it was the first provider who supplied the goods.
Since the argument is completely symmetric, we can conclude that the identity
of providers is kept secret.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, a flow-sensitive security model is presented to analyze the infor-
mation flow in the federated cloud system. The entities of the cloud system are
typed into different security levels which form a security lattice ordered by the
security levels, each cloud is also mapped into a security level in the security
lattice to specify the confidential level of the cloud. Coloured Petri nets model
is built to verify the correctness of the secure information flow. Opacity as a
promising technique for unifying security properties is introduced to cloud com-
puting systems. This study can help to track and control the secure information
flow in federated cloud system, and it also can be used to analyze the impact of
different resources allocation strategies.
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